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Moralism and Realism in Campaign
Finance Reform
Bruce E. Caint
Forty-seven years ago, Hans Morgenthau published an
influential treatise entitled Politics Among Nations.' Morgenthau
argued that United States foreign policy-making was character-
ized by excessive moral idealism and the neglect of well-defined,
objective national interests.2 Politics Among Nations spawned an
important debate about what the real national interests in
international relations were and what a policy true to those
interests would look like. This was later labeled the "realist"
approach to foreign policy. Whether U.S. foreign policy-making is
any more realistic and any less moralistic today as a result of
Morgenthau's efforts is certainly arguable, but at a minimum
Morgenthau succeeded in giving objective national interests a
more prominent role in academic foreign policy discussions.
The campaign finance reform debate is at a similar intellec-
tual juncture. Many recent analyses of this issue rely on vaguely
defined moralistic terms such as "corruption," "unfairness," and
"trusteeship." Few look at the real interests underlying campaign
finance regulation in a democracy.3 This is particularly true of
those who would reform the system. The moral idealism of these
reformers leads them in impractical and ultimately futile direc-
tions. For example, they try to regulate the motives underlying
representatives' public actions, or they pursue a vision of "delib-
erative democracy" that strays far from the philosophical premis-
es of what I will later term a "proceduralist" democracy.' Even
t Robson Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley and Associ-
ate Director, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley.
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (Alfred A. Knopf, 3d ed 1960).
2 Id.
I have in mind groups such as Common Cause, the League of Women Voters, and
other so-called "good government" reform groups. An excellent example of a group that
assumes its normative views and spends a great deal of time marshalling data and
inventing proposals is the California Commission on Campaign Financing, which has is-
sued a number of reports including, The New Gold Rush: Financing California's Legisla-
tive Campaigns (Center for Responsive Government, 1985). The tendency to see corrup-
tion everywhere is also present in Elizabeth Drew, Politics and Money: The New Road to
Corruption (Macmillan, 1983).
The approach to institutional design I have in mind is discussed at length in Ber-
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more importantly, moralist/idealist approaches tend to downplay,
and in some cases disregard, the central role that equity plays in
political regulation generally, and in campaign finance reform
specifically.
The core problem in campaign finance is not corruption in
the traditional sense.5 Rather, it is how far equity considerations
can and should be carried in a democracy. Proposed ways of
handling campaign finance implicate the distribution of power
and influence among various constituents and groups in a democ-
racy. These implications are the "real" interests in the campaign
finance reform debate. By littering the intellectual landscape
with irrelevant issues, moralist/idealists obstruct the path to a
full, open discussion of the public's views about the proper distri-
bution of power and influence.
Part I of this Article considers the arguments of two promi-
nent moralist/idealist critics, Professor Daniel Hays Lowenstein
and Professor Dennis Thompson, and analyzes the strengths and
weaknesses of this kind of approach. Part II links the "real"
interests of campaign finance reform to the principles of a proce-
dural democracy.
I. MORALISM IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: TWO EXAMPLES
Academics and journalists commonly assert that campaign
money corrupts the American political system. They less com-
monly explore in any detail what "corruption" means.6 The po-
litical science literature has historically focused more on empiri-
cally measuring the influence of political money upon electoral
and legislative outcomes than on normatively questioning wheth-
er the influence of money is appropriate or inappropriate. Two
recent articles, one by Professor Daniel Hays Lowenstein and one
nard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds, The Federalist Papers and the New Institutional-
ism (Agathon, 1989). It is neo-Madisonian in its assumptions about the fallibility of
human nature and the need to design institutions to compensate for imperfect behavior.
' Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is
Deeply Rooted, 18 Hofstra L Rev 301, 302 (1989); Dennis F. Thompson, Mediated Corrup-
tion: The Case of the Keating Five, 87 Am Pol Sci Rev 369 (1993).
' There is, however, a small but thoughtful literature on the concept of corruption.
Some of the key studies are: Arnold Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T.
Levine, eds, Political Corruption: A Handbook (Transaction Publishers, 1989); John G.
Peters and Susan Welch, Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions and a
Theory, 72 Am Pol Sci Rev 974 (1978); Edward C. Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of
Governmental Organization, 18 J L & Econ 587 (1975); Andrew Stark, Corporate Electoral
Activity, Constitutional Discourse and Conceptions of the Individual, 86 Am Pol Sci Rev
626 (1992).
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by Professor Dennis Thompson, are noteworthy and significant
exceptions to this generalization.7 Both pieces represent serious
efforts to explicate the sense in which political money "corrupts"
the democratic process. For this reason, they deserve careful
scrutiny. In the end, however, their arguments are persuasive
only if we are willing to accept highly idealized notions about the
appropriate motives for democratic public policy-making, ideals
that are certainly not part of any minimal consensus in the Unit-
ed States and do not derive in any easily recognizable fashion
from this country's Madisonian philosophical foundations.
A. Professor Lowenstein Considered
Lowenstein's approach to campaign finance reform is one of
the clearest examples in either the legal or political science liter-
ature of "motive-based regulation."8 Motive-based regulation is
the attempt to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate mo-
tives in political representation and to weed out the latter
through prohibition or limitation. Lowenstein's argument is "mo-
tive based" in the following sense. The essence of the campaign
finance problem, he asserts, is the "payment of money to bias the
judgment or sway the loyalty of persons holding positions of
public trust . . . ."' Since money has "the power to tempt men
and women to stray not only from their ethical responsibilities,
but from their own highest interests," it is a deeply rooted and
pervasive evil that must be curbed if we are to protect the basic
value structure of a democratic society. 10 Bribery defined in the
traditional sense, the performance of public duty in exchange for
something of personal value, is the paradigmatic instance of
political corruption. To the extent that "present practices are
corrupting in the traditional sense," (that is, meaning that cam-
paign contributions operate like a traditional bribe), there is a
need for regulation.' In particular, a "campaign contribution
made with the intent to influence official conduct" (that is, the
so-called "legislative strategy") constitutes bribery in the spirit of
1 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is
Deeply Rooted, 18 Hofstra L Rev 301 (1989)(cited in note 5); Dennis F. Thompson, Mediat-
ed Corruption: The Case of the Keating Five, 87 Am Pol Sci Rev 369 (1993)(cited in note
5).
Lowenstein, 18 Hofstra L Rev at 301 (cited in note 5).
Id at 302.
1o Id.
" Id at 305 (emphasis omitted).
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the traditional definition.12 Although Lowenstein does not make
a case for new law in this area, one policy direction that would
seem to flow naturally from his analysis is a more vigorous pros-
ecution of legislatively oriented contributions as crimes.
Lowenstein himself, however, takes a different tack. He proposes
instead a package of contribution limits and party-based public
financing that would encourage expenditures along party lines
and alleviate the need to raise money from special interests.13
Lowenstein's analysis has several problems. The argument
that campaign contributions bias the judgment of representatives
consists of two parts: an empirical assessment that the receipt of
contributions influences the judgment of representatives, and a
normative argument about why such influence constitutes a "bi-
as." The first is a lively topic of dispute in political science.14
Lowenstein regards the failure of quantitative political science to
provide clear evidence on this point as a technical measurement
problem, and he concludes that, as a matter of common sense,
money must matter.15 Even assuming that Lowenstein is right,
the critical question is why a change in judgment caused by re-
ceiving a campaign contribution should be characterized as a
bias.
To provide a framework for thinking about the
representative's position, Lowenstein draws on legal notions of
trusteeship and conflict of interest. The representative is, in his
view, a trustee for his constituents with the obligation to exercise
his or her best judgment unbiased by considerations of personal
gain. Lowenstein's conception of trusteeship is somewhat differ-
ent from the traditional democratic theory definition, which im-
plies that the representative should exercise independent judg-
ment. While the traditional notion of representative as trustee is
12 Lowenstein, 18 Hofstra L Rev at 329 (cited in note 5).
Id at 345-368.
'4 Some of the most recent studies include: John R. Wright, Contributions, Lobbying
and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 84 Am Pol Sci Rev 417
(1990)(arguing that lobbying rather than money influences the policy decisions of repre-
sentatives); Laura I. Langbein, Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence, 48 J Pol
1052 (1986)(providing quantitative evidence concerning access as a motivation for political
contributions); James F. Herndon, Access, Record, and Competition as Influences on Inter-
est Group Contributions to Congressional Campaigns, 44 J Pol 996 (1982)(testing hypoth-
esis regarding campaign contributions by interest groups); Richard L. Hall and Frank W.
Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional
Committees, 84 Am Pol Sci Rev 797 (1990)(arguing that money interests do effect the
legislative process). For a general assessment of the state of the literature, see Frank J.
Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities (Yale University Press, 1992).
1-5 Lowenstein, 18 Hofstra L Rev at 313-322 (cited in note 5).
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compatible with Lowenstein's formulation, it is more restrictive.
Lowenstein's definition encompasses any independent or elector-
ally based judgment that does not involve personal gain. A repre-
sentative who accepts large contributions from interest groups
that are pursuing a "legislative strategy" places himself or herself
in a potential conflict of interest position in which "the individual
may deliberately set aside his or her obligations of trust in favor
of self-interest."1 In a very revealing paragraph, Lowenstein
proposes a way to ascertain whether a campaign contribution
places representatives in a conflict of interest situation:
If the political system did not allow for contributions,
each legislator's position on the scale would be deter-
mined by considerations such as constituency, ideology
and party. The positions determined in this manner will
be referred to as the legislators' "natural" positions. The
natural position for each legislator, of course, is differ-
ent .... Not to put too fine a point on things, a depar-
ture from a natural position will be called "cash-moti-
vated." 7
In sum, interest groups pursuing a legislative strategy contribute
money to a representative to move the legislator's position closer
to their own, and representatives who accept this money may be
letting inappropriate motives (that is, getting campaign contribu-
tions) bias their judgment away from a so-called "natural posi-
tion" in favor of personal gain. 8
The critical questions raised by this particular conception of
corruption are whether all forms of personal gain are inappropri-
ate for representatives and, if not, which ones are appropriate
and why? For instance, when a representative adopts a position
on an issue to help himself or herself get reelected, this choice is
seemingly based on the personal gain of holding office. Indeed,
the American political system depends upon the existence of a
certain number of people who think that holding office is a per-
sonal gain; it is hard to imagine why anyone would endure the
hardships of running for office in contemporary America if they
did not enjoy the power and prestige of being an officeholder. Is
this form of personal gain acceptable, and, if so, why? Or, to take
another example, when a party leader tells a representative to
'6 Id at 324.
'" Id at 318.
18 Id.
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follow the party whip if the representative wishes to advance up
the leadership ladder, receive a bigger office, or hire more staff,
the whip's inducement is based on the representative's personal
gain. If all considerations of personal gain were eliminated, many
of the common mechanisms for electoral and party accountability
would be rendered ineffective. Assuming that few if any commen-
tators would favor eliminating all considerations of personal gain
from politics, the question becomes why the personal gain at-
tached to receiving a campaign contribution is different from the
gain of reelection or career advancement.
Resolving this question is crucial to evaluating how appropri-
ate the analogy is between traditional bribery and campaign
contribution bribery: is there a difference between taking public
action in exchange for money to be used privately and taking
public action in exchange for a campaign contribution? For many
reformers, the answer seems to be no, because money is a
uniquely important resource even when it is only spent for elec-
toral purposes." This is a curious argument since a contribution
per se is not more important than a vote (that is, 51 percent of
the vote dominates an infinite amount of campaign money). Elec-
tion is the goal; votes and contributions are the means to that
goal. According to some reformers, an official who takes a public
action in exchange for contributions is guilty of bribery, but one
who exchanges public actions for votes is not. This makes no
sense. The personal benefit in both cases is holding office: money
and votes are used to win elections, and as between the two,
votes are more crucial than money.
An even more profound question concerns the kind of reason-
ing one would apply to this question. One could look to prevailing
public expectations for guidance. Lowenstein, for instance, states
in his article that he is not seeking the elimination of all self-
interest, but rather only those personal benefits that are not
"implicit in the relationship of trust."" But what standard de-
termines when a motive is implicit in the relationship of trust?
Lowenstein suggests that this determination is grounded in cul-
tural expectations regarding proper or improper behavior: people
intuitively know that it is wrong to exchange public decision for
contributions, and bribery is formally proscribed in "most Ameri-
can jurisdictions." 1 As a sociological assertion, this argument
I See, for example, Lowenstein, 18 Hofstra L Rev at 301 (cited in note 5).
20 Id at 328.
21 Id at 329.
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seemingly fails: cultural expectations must be less clear with
respect to campaign contributions than traditional bribes, or we
would not be having this dispute. But from a democratic theory
point of view, even if everyone agreed that exchanging money for
a public decision is wrong, we would still want to know the rea-
sons behind these norms. Why should a democratic culture re-
gard a particular activity as inappropriate? Are there reasons for
proscribing certain practices in a democracy that go beyond sim-
ply saying that something must be inappropriate because some or
many people think that it is?
Aside from cultural or public opinion arguments, is there a
difference in terms of democratic theory between a traditional
bribe and an electoral contribution? The most important differ-
ence is that a contribution is effective only because it helps
achieve electoral success, while a representative values a tradi-
tional bribe regardless of whether the bribe helps win elections.
Nonelectoral personal gains pose a problem for at least two
reasons. First, because the state holds a monopoly on public
goods, the politician can exploit that power to accrue great per-
sonal wealth and contribute to enormous societal inefficiency.
Accordingly, public sector inefficiency is a major problem in coun-
tries where bribery is prevalent.
Another and even more critical difference between tradition-
al bribes and contributions is that bribes often respond to a
politician's desire for something other than votes. Campaign
contributions are useful because they help get votes. Bribes,
however, deal in a currency of self-interest other than votes. If
campaign contributions can only be used to persuade others to
vote a certain way, then voters still have sovereignty-their votes
are what matter in the end, and they can ignore or discount the
messages they receive if they choose. The moralist may prefer
disinterestedness or public spiritedness, but electoral selfishness
is a fundamental premise in a democracy. The personal gains
resulting from either receiving a promise of voting support or a
campaign contribution are purely electoral. The campaign contri-
bution is ultimately translated into the currency of votes. The
pure legislative bribe is not.
As will be argued later, one of the critical issues in campaign
finance reform is what actions a polity is willing to take to equal-
ize the voices and influence of its voters. From a reformer's
standpoint, it is difficult to formulate campaign finance as an
equity issue because there is no consensus in America about
matters of equality. The advantage to Lowenstein's formulation
ill]
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of the campaign contribution as a form of bribery is that it
analogizes contributions with something widely held to be wrong
(that is, the traditional bribe). However, as discussed above, the
chief disadvantages of Lowenstein's approach are that it requires
accepting his views about appropriate motives in representation
(or what he believes people regard as appropriate motives), and it
ignores critical differences between a traditional bribe and a
campaign contribution.
B. Professor Thompson Considered
A second recent moralist approach is Dennis Thompson's
analysis of the Keating Five scandal.22 Thompson does not be-
lieve that the act of giving campaign contributions is bad per se.
He seeks instead to identify the conditions under which other-
wise legitimate political actions like giving money are corrupt be-
cause they subvert the democratic process. Such actions are
called "mediated corruption," because the corruption is "filtered
through various practices that are otherwise legitimate."23
Thompson's democratic ideal is grander than the usual pro-
cedural justification for democracy-that is, more than the formal
Dahlian conditions regarding franchise rights, the weighting of
votes, or the aggregation rules that determine electoral win-
ners.24 Rather, it is a vision of government that aims for ethical
laws by means of the democratic processes of political discussion
and competition. In a "deliberative democracy," the moral reasons
for and against a policy must be fully and publicly discussed
because discussion best promotes ethical decisions. Thompson
justifies the democratic process by highlighting its proclivity to
produce ethical results. Accordingly, the rules for appropriate
conduct in a democratic system are guided by the ultimate goal
of producing ethical policies.
Drawing on his previous work, Thompson invokes three
principles of legislative ethics "which identify the general charac-
teristics that a system of representation should have in order to
provide conditions for making morally justifiable decisions."25
They are the following: (1) generality, or the justification of policy
in terms that apply to all citizens equally; (2) autonomy, or the
22 Thompson, 87 Am Pol Sci Rev 369 (cited in note 5).
23 Id.
24 See, generally, Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (University of Chicago
Press, 1956).
2' Thompson, 87 Am Pol Sci Rev at 373 (cited in note 5).
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responsibility of the legislator to act on relevant reasons and to
investigate the merits of claims; and (3) publicity, the require-
ment that legislative acts be placed on record and made public at
the time of action.26 The connection between a constituent and a
legislator is more corrupt as the aim of the contributor is more
particular (that is, violates generality), the contribution is less
closely connected to the substantive merits of the issues (that is,
violates autonomy), and the exchange is not open and public
(that is, violates publicity).27 Thompson reviews the facts of the
Keating case and concludes that Senator Alan Cranston's actions
were corrupt under these standards.28
Like Lowenstein, Thompson distinguishes between electoral
and legislative contributions (that is, contributions intended to
influence the outcome of elections versus those intended to influ-
ence the actions of legislators once in office). Where Lowenstein
invokes the notions of trust and conflict of interest to identify
inappropriate or corrupt legislative actions, Thompson relies on
his principles of legislative ethics and the deliberative democracy
ideal."
Thompson argues that a purely legislative contribution strat-
egy corrupts deliberative democracy in at least two senses. First,
contributions that influence the actions of legislators undermine
deliberative democracy because they corrupt the legislator's judg-
ment. Money deflects his or her attention away from the substan-
tive merits of issues. This argument is similar to, but even more
restrictive than, Lowenstein's notion that some motives are im-
plicit in the trustee relationship and that money considerations
bias the representative's judgment away from legitimate motives.
Lowenstein at least permits considerations of constituency and
party to enter into a representative's thinking, whereas Thomp-
son desires representatives to focus exclusively on considerations
of substantive and ethical merit.
Second, a purely legislative contribution strategy undermines
deliberative democracy because it bypasses the democratic pro-
cess of open discussion and competition. The representative who
kills a bill or intervenes with an agency on behalf of a donor is
aiming for a particular private end, acting on the basis of
nonsubstantive reasons, and proceeding in secret. Lowenstein
26 Id at 373-74.
27 Id.
2s Id at 374.
9 Thompson, 87 Am Pol Sci Rev at 374 (cited in note 5).
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suggests that his principles of legislative ethics could both be
used to identify corrupt connections and incorporated into en-
forceable standards.3 0
To a greater degree than Lowenstein, Thompson appreciates
and acknowledges the moralist/idealist foundations of his views
about corruption. But for those whose vision of democracy is
more purely procedural and less ethical, these standards seem
excessively restrictive and very naive. As compared to the delib-
erative model, examples of procedural democratic conceptions
include the Madisonian (where the purpose of the democracy is to
prevent majority and minority tyranny), and the economic/choice-
based models (where collective choices are made through the
mechanism of electoral competition).3' A deliberative democracy
seeks to produce ethical decisions based on substantive merit.
The procedaral conceptions confer legitimacy on majority deci-
sions as long as the decisions do not violate basic individual
rights. The deliberative conception rests on the rationalist's faith
that right reasons can be found for actions and that political
discourse will lead to the discovery of commonly acknowledged
truth. The procedural version of democracy accepts the inevitabil-
ity of disagreements and conflict, and seeks to build consensus
through bargaining and compromise. Of the two types, the
philosophical foundations of the United States Government align
much more closely with the procedural ideal than the delibera-
tive ideal.32 Thus, one problem with Thompson's approach to
corruption is that it rests on a nontraditional conception of Amer-
ican democracy.
A second and related problem is that, like Lowenstein's anal-
ysis, Thompson's analysis assumes a trustee notion of representa-
tion, and no evidence exists that all or even most Americans
want their representatives to act in that way. The representative
in a deliberative democracy weighs the substantive merits of
policy choices, is guided by standards of legislative ethics (that is,
generality, autonomy, and publicity), and aspires to make moral-
ly justified decisions. This, in essence, is a traditional trustee
model in which the representative exercises his or her best judg-
ment based upon moral reasons and guidelines. The competing,
30 Id at 377-78.
" See, generally, Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 23-24 (Harper
and Row,' 1957); Federalist 10 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 77-
84 (Mentor, 1961).
32 Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds, The Federalist Papers and the Ne w
Institutionalism (Agathon, 1989)(cited in note 4).
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and more widely accepted, delegate model of representation as-
sumes that representatives act in accordance with constituents'
desires.33 For instance, the so-called economic theory of democ-
racy holds that representatives act on the preferences of the
median voter.34 This seems to pose a serious problem. If one's
theory of corruption and the need for political regulation stem
from an understanding of representation that is not widely
shared, the regulations one proposes will seem anomalous, to say
the least, and will quite likely be unenforceable.
Third, Thompson's definition of actions that subvert or cor-
rupt the democratic process actually fails to resolve many key
issues in campaign finance regulation. For Thompson, the contri-
bution from Keating to Senator Cranston was almost incidental
to the transaction's corruption. The money connected Keating to
Cranston's corrupt act, but the wrongness of Cranston's action in
this case lies in its particularism, the absence of substantive mer-
it in Cranston's reasoning and the fact that it was done in secret.
Based on what Thompson tells us, if Cranston had intervened in
the Lincoln Savings and Loan investigation for the sake of get-
ting Keating's vote or just because he liked Keating personally,
Cranston's behavior still would have been corrupt as long as it
violated the three criteria of legislative ethics. To put this in the
terms of our earlier discussion, Thompson's argument arguably
expands the definition of bribery (traditionally defined as taking
something of personal value in exchange for public action) beyond
Lowenstein's definition (equating a campaign contribution with
something of personal value) to include any legitimate political
action, such as a pledge of vote support, that is corrupt under the
conditions he specifies. Obviously, this would constitute a sub-
stantial infringement upon the activities of contemporary repre-
sentatives.
Ironically, while Thompson's definition of corruption classi-
fies many activities that do not involve money as corrupt under
certain conditions, it classifies many actions that do involve mon-
ey as not corrupt. For instance, while some might argue that
large campaign contributions subvert the democratic process by
undercutting the equal weight assigned to each person's vote in
the electoral system, Thompson's notion of corruption does not
See, generally, Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, in Hannah
Fenichel Pitkin, ed, Representation 17-18 (Atherton Press, 1969).
" Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (cited in note 31); William H. Riker and
Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 Am Pol Sci Rev 25 (1968).
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address this problem. Were a legislator to take large sums of
money from an interest group, prevent any measures the interest
group opposes from getting through his or her committee, give
ideological reasons for his or her actions, and make no effort to
hide his or her position, under Thompson's criteria there is no
corruption. However, it is likely that many reformers such as
Lowenstein would be as concerned about the propriety of this
situation as with the Keating case. Because equity is not explicit-
ly part of the notion of deliberative democracy, Thompson's no-
tion of democratic subversion is extremely narrow. My point is
not that a democracy necessarily implies the extreme egalitarian
position of prohibiting lobbying and group campaign donations,
but only that Thompson's intellectual apparatus provides no way
to assess certain aspects of bribery, corruption, and reform.
II. PROCEDURAL NOTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
REGULATION
Professors Lowenstein and Thompson offer a defensible basis
for reform to those who equate representation with legal trustee-
ship or to those who find ethical formulations of democracy per-
suasive. Neither critique, however, is really suitable for those
who adopt the more common position that representatives act as
delegates for individual voters and for groups, or that democracy
is procedurally, not ethically, defined. Taking the latter perspec-
tive shifts the reform focus drastically and pushes equity issues
to the forefront of the reform debate.
The tradition of procedural fairness, rather than ethical
outcomes, is expressed in the writings of Madison, Dahl,
Schumpeter, and Downs. 5 The key aspect of procedural theories
is that democratic systems aggregate citizen preferences to make
collective decisions about representatives. Representatives are
delegates who act according to the wishes of their constituents in
order to get elected. The goal of a procedural demdcracy is to con-
fer widespread legitimacy on government actions. Policy out-
comes are judged according to the standards that citizens bring
to the ballot box and the basic rights that are assigned to individ-
uals either by tradition or by the Constitution. Fairness is a
critical question in at least two senses: it distinguishes various
' Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 269 (Harper and Row,
1962); Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 131 (University of Chicago Press,
1956)(cited in note 24); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 23-24 (Harper
and Row, 1957)(cited in note 31).
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procedural democracy variants from one another, and it has
shaped the evolution of political regulation in those systems.
The purely populist variant of procedural democracy bestows
complete legitimacy upon the majority preference. By contrast,
Madisonian and Dahlian theories attempt to balance the majority
will with minority and individual rights.36 Procedural issues
classify democracies in other ways as well: which voters should
be included in a fair aggregation (for example, debates over legit-
imate franchise restrictions), or how the rules of preference ag-
gregation should work (pluralism, unanimity, proportional,
majoritarian, etc.) are examples of the ways in which differences
over fairness underlie differences in democratic rules.37 Thus,
the usual justification for proportional representation over win-
ner-take-all systems is not that it produces better or more ethical
laws, but that it extends greater fairness to minority interests
and enhances their feelings that government actions are legiti-
mate.38
Fairness is also important in the sense that changing ideas
about political equality have fundamentally shaped the evolution
of U.S. political regulation. Focusing on this critical point, section
A explores the basic features of procedural democracies and sec-
tion B relates those formal features to various regulation issues,
including campaign finance reform.
A. Preventing Coerced Preferences
Procedural democratic theories focus on the ways that citizen
preferences are aggregated into legitimate collective decisions.
Certain formal conditions are essential in any procedural democ-
racy. One of the most basic democratic principles is that individu-
als must have the freedom to form preferences without external
coercion. If individual choices are not free, then a polity's collec-
tive decisions are not legitimate in the sense of arising from
genuine citizen preferences. Thus, one of the earliest political
reforms in modern democracies introduced the secret ballot,
thereby protecting voters from coercion and intimidation at the
Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory at 131-32 (cited in note 24).
' See, generally, Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (Yale
University Press, 1967).
See, for example, two recent arguments for proportional representation in Lani
Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority 5 (The Free Press, 1994); Douglas J. Amy, Real
Choices/New Voices: The Case for Proportional Representation Elections in the United
States 128-30 (Columbia University Press, 1993).
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ballot box. Only with a public vote can the coercing party monitor
(and then reward or punish) the actions of the coerced. By giving
voters privacy, the secret ballot took away the knowledge (how
people actually voted) essential for intimidation and coercion,
preserving individual freedom of choice at the ballot box.
Are there freedom-of-choice problems in the campaign fi-
nance reform debate? For the most part, the answer is no, since
campaign finance reform is primarily about undue influence
rather than the abuse of power. For instance, Lowenstein's story
about the evil of political money is not about coercion, but about
how money taints the legislators' judgments. However, one claim
about coercion deserves consideration. While the conventional
story about special interest group contributions is that they po-
tentially alter legislator behavior, interest group lobbyists some-
times argue the opposite-that legislators force groups to give
money in order to maintain access to the legislator, or to keep
the legislator from taking some threatened action (that is, so-
called "tree-shaking" activities). In short, the problem, lobbyists
argue, is extortion by elected officials, not bribery by the interest
groups.
Reformers tend not to take this complaint very seriously,
even though society regards extortion as at least as serious a
problem as bribery. Why? One reason may be that the interest
groups are often wealthy or well-organized and thus are hardly
defenseless victims. Legislators can threaten all they want, but
most people with money have the means to fight back. It may not
be pretty, but it is a fair fight. Another reason may be that the
United States's system is by all academic and journalistic ac-
counts very open to interest group influence. 9 The structure of
the United States Government decentralizes the power to stop
things by placing that power in committees and key leaders, but
requires a high degree of consensus in order for new legislation
to succeed. Hence, negative power (that is, the power to stop
things) is easier to attain in the United States's system than is
positive power (that is, the power to make policy happen), and
since interest groups usually try to resist regulation rather than
impose it, they possess some natural advantages in the system.
These are both strong responses to the lobbyists' lament.
Nevertheless, what if, after all is said and done, legislators can
"g See, for example, David Truman, The Governmental Process 264 (Alfred A. Knopf,
1965); Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American De-
mocracy 390 (Harper and Row, 1986).
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and do extort campaign finance money from interest groups in
this way? Is this a serious concern? It is under certain circum-
stances. If campaign contributions are an alternative form of
"voice," an important difference between a contribution and a
vote (aside from the obvious cardinalization of one and not the
other, which is crucial from an equity standpoint) is that the vote
is secret and the contribution is not. For this reason, the contrib-
utor is more exposed to the danger of extortion than the voter.
Consider a couple of different scenarios. In the first case, a legis-
lator threatens to sponsor a bill a group opposes unless the group
gives money for the legislator's personal use. Clearly, this type of
behavior is and should be unlawful in a democracy, since it al-
lows officeholders to exploit the monopolistic position of the state
as regulator and rulemaker for personal gain. This behavior is
traditional bribery. In the second case, the legislator uses a "tree-
shaking" threat to extort promises to vote. Since the freedom to
vote for or against the legislator is still protected by the secret
ballot, this threat is not credible. No need exists for further regu-
lation here. But what about a third case, one where the legislator
demands contributions in exchange for access or actions?
If the interest group cannot protect itself, and if the legisla-
tor is really that powerful, then the problem cannot be ignored.
But can it be regulated in a sensible way? Unfortunately, it is not
always feasible to distinguish between real and perceived threats
or between actions taken in retribution and those stemming from
genuine policy disagreement. Broadly interpreted, any relation-
ship between a legislator and a regulated interest group might
seem at least implicitly threatening, and many interest groups
could potentially claim extortion. Moreover, if this protection has
to be extended to other forms of speech and association (such as
working on a campaign) in which the actions can be known and
monitored, we might be led down a seemingly endless path of
regulation.
For all these reasons, regulation should occur only when a
demonstrated problem exists. If such a problem exists, one possi-
bility would be to extend to regulated industries or affected inter-
est groups the kinds of protections given to civil servants and
government employees, namely, prohibitions or limits on the
contributions they can make to elected officials that serve on the
committees with specific jurisdiction over their industries or
activities. Since contributions are an important form of voice
(that is, a way of signaling support for candidates), such limi-
tations restrict political speech and association and should only
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be imposed when a substantial possibility of extortion exists. An-
other possible remedy for this kind of extortion would be legisla-
tive reforms weakening the power of individuals to carry out
unilateral threats against interest groups-for instance, restric-
tions on the powers of committees, subcommittees, and oversight
responsibility. The advantage of this approach is that it focuses
upon the institutional conditions that make extortion possible
without infringing upon the constituents' First Amendment
rights.
B. Providing Sufficient Information
A second basic condition in a procedural democracy is that
individuals must have sufficient, although not necessarily com-
plete or perfect, information to make choices. Deprivation of
essential information or subjection to only limited positions or
views substantially degrades the individual's ability to form gen-
uine preferences. Free speech and the widespread promulgation
of information are essential in a procedural democracy because
they secure the conditions under which voters can be sufficiently
informed to make choices.4 °
Speech and information issues permeate many aspects of
political regulation. For example, consider the question of permis-
sible restrictions on the franchise. The right to vote is a critical
form of political speech in a democracy. Attempts to restrict that
right to people who have direct interests or intimate knowledge
of the issues receive strict scrutiny by the courts.
Free speech questions are also central to campaign finance
reform. The courts have interpreted campaign contributions and
expenditures as forms of speech and association, thereby placing
significant constraints on the permissible types of campaign fi-
nance reform.41 Since the Supreme Court's view that political
money is a form of political speech has been examined extensive-
ly by other scholars, it will not be taken up here.42 Rather, I
40 I use the term "sufficiently informed" because voters can make good choices even
when they are not fully informed. See Bernard Grofman, ed, Information, Participation
and Choice 34-35 (University of Michigan Press, 1993).
" See Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 20-21 (1976); First National Bank of Boston v
Bellotti, 435 US 765, 784 (1978).
42 See, generally, Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First
Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 Cal L Rev 1045 (1985); Brice M. Clagett
and John R. Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath and Its Prospects: The Constitutional-
ity of Government Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29 Vand L Rev 1327
(1976); John S. Shockley, Money in Politics: Judicial Roadblocks to Campaign Finance
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want to formulate the usual issue in slightly different terms: if
political money is political speech, then what is its informational
value?
Political money communicates two kinds of information.
First, constituent contributions and expenditures signal support
for particular candidates to the candidates themselves and to
other voters and groups in the electorate. As other writers have
noted, because money is a cardinalized value, individuals and
groups can express the intensity of their preferences in a way
that the single-valued, equally weighted vote cannot." Of
course, political money is an impure measure of preference inten-
sity. Since individuals and groups possess unequal amounts of
money, the same sum of money given by individuals or groups
with unequal resources may not signify the same level of prefer-
ence intensity. A better measure of intensity would weight the
size of a monetary contribution according to the giver's initial
level of resources. Absent this measure, however, the actual mon-
etary amount can serve as a proxy for the level of support; the
higher the contributions, the stronger the presumed level of sup-
port, and the higher the presumed intensity of feeling about
particular policy positions. Such inferences may not be complete-
ly accurate, but they serve as a reasonable rule of thumb for
people in politics.
Contributions and expenditures also convey valuable infor-
mation to other voters. Recent research reveals that under cer-
tain conditions voters are likely to use information about contri-
butions to infer what candidates stand for and what initiative
measures mean: they are a kind of information cue that voters
can use when they are otherwise uncertain about how to vote."
For instance, a candidate who accepts large contributions from
the insurance industry reveals his or her association to that
sector's interests. Voters will infer that his or her positions in
office will correspond closer to the insurance industry's view-
Reform, 10 Hastings Const L Q 679 (1983); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution:
Is Money Speech?, 85 Yale L J 1001'(1976); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosa-
ic: Campaign Finance and the First Amendment After Austin, 21 Cap U L Rev 381 (1992);
Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18 Hofstra L
Rev 213 (1989).
' One of the strongest statements for the informational value of campaign contribu-
tions is found in David Austin-Smith, Campaign Contributions and Access
(1994)(unpublished manuscript on file with The University of Chicago Legal Forum).
" Arthur Lupia, Voter Information, Endorsements and Electoral Outcomes: Insurance
Reform in California (1991)(unpublished manuscript on file with The University of Chica-
go Legal Forum).
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points than to those of trial lawyers or consumer groups.' At
the same time, while disclosure has increased the informational
value of contributions, individual and group limits on contribu-
tions have not. By encouraging political action committees
("PACs"), independent spending, and coordinated subterfuges of
legal limits, limitations on contributions have masked the connec-
tion between candidates and various groups and interests.46
Ironically, money may yield more information in initiative cam-
paigns, in which little or no regulation exists beyond disclosure,
than in candidate campaigns that respect contribution limits and
expenditure caps.
Not only does political money signal voter preferences, hav-
ing informational value as a signal, it also subsidizes the educa-
tion of the American voter at each election. While many disturb-
ing, developments in campaign methods have seriously degraded
the educational value of political campaigns (for example, the
prevalence of the thirty-second spot), campaigns are still the
most important way that many voters learn about issues and
candidates.4 v With the exception of public financing at the Unit-
ed States presidential level and in certain local governmental
elections, private money finances most of the campaign activities
in this country.' Limits on total private campaign expenditures
implicitly limit the activities that educate voters. The critical
question with respect to the second (informational) component of
a procedural democracy is whether campaign finance laws fa-
cilitate providing sufficient information for voters to make in-
formed choices.
As mentioned above, disclosure promotes disseminating the
information that is contained in contribution and expenditure
levels. The question remains, however, how to reform campaign
finance to ensure an appropriate level of information in the sys-
tem. There is an upper- and lower-end problem with campaign
spending. Aggregate limits on total spending regulate the upper-
end problem, the problem of too much spending. Many political
' This assumes that there is public disclosure of contributions and expenditures,
which is a reasonable assumption for most state and federal offices.
" See Michael J. Malbin, ed, Money and Politics in the United States (Chatham
House Publishers, 1984).
" There is a division among political scientists as to how much campaigns matter.
See, generally, David Butler and Austin Ranney, eds, Electioneering: A Comparative
Study of Continuity and Change (Oxford University Press, 1992); Bruce E. Cain, Lessons
from the Inside, in Gerald C. Lubenow, ed, California Votes: The 1990 Governor's Race
201-17 (IGS Press, 1991).
' Frank J. Sorauf, Money in American Elections 44 (Scott, Foresman and Co., 1988).
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scientists do not understand the rationale behind upper-end
boundaries. When one side spends obscenely more than the oth-
er, there is an equity problem. When both sides spend a great
deal, it is less clear what problem exists. If taxpayer money is
being spent, one might worry about wastefulness, or the opportu-
nity costs of spending the money on a given campaign but not on
another, or about spending money on mere politics instead of
important policy programs. Private contributions, however, do
not present these concerns. If campaign money is freely given to
finance real campaign activities, then the question of whether
there should be caps is at least implicitly either about whether
there can be too much information or activity in a given race or
election, or about whether people need to be protected from giv-
ing more than they should to political campaigns. Neither of
these problems seem important in a procedural democracy. An
extensive literature in political science shows that voters know
appallingly little about particular candidates or even about how a
democratic system operates.49 Anything that lessens the amount
of information in the system only makes that problem worse. As
for the "problem" of giving too much information, it is far from
clear how one could make such a determination. Even then, a
limit of this sort would represent a substantial infringement on
freedom of speech.
The information problem more typically is on the lower end
than the upper end. The American political system tends to pro-
duce inadequate, low-quality information and forces the costs of
political education onto those interests most directly affected by
government policies. While rarely if ever acknowledged as such,
political campaigns are somewhat analogous to public goods. The
educative benefits of a campaign are indivisible (particularly
when they are disseminated via the press or paid media spots),
while the costs are divisible. The nub of the classic public goods
problem is that some people have the incentive to "free ride" on
the resources of others while still enjoying the benefits of the
indivisible good (from which they cannot be excluded).5 ° Studies
of participation in America show that only a tiny minority of
voters give to political campaigns.5' Sometimes voters consent to
" See, generally, Phillip E. Converse, Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan
Attitudes, 26 Pub Op Q 578 (1962); Phillip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief System in
Mass Publics, in David E. Apter, ed, Ideology and Discontent 206-61 (Collier-Macmillan,
1964).
' See Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory
of Groups 15-16 (Schucker Books, 1965).
" Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim, Participation and Political Equali-
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public financing schemes, but even then the level of public fi-
nancing is chronically inadequate, and the checkoff schemes
preserve the right to "opt out" of paying for political informa-
tion.52 Fortunately, interest groups and a small minority of
highly motivated individual donors willingly bear the costs to get
their message across or to get their people elected, but, as shown
below, the private market for this quasi-public good operates in
potentially inequitable ways. Why reformer/idealists worry more
about the upper-end problem than the lower-end one is truly
baffling. Perhaps they have either confused the distinction be-
tween the total amount versus the equity of spending, or, even
more importantly, they are unwilling to allow equity issues to
occupy the center of the reform debate.
C. Equity and Political Regulation
Aside from the first two conditions-autonomy and adequate
information-much of the controversy in political regulation cen-
ters on procedural and outcome fairness. Three equity issues are
particularly important in political regulation: participation fair-
ness, influence fairness, and outcome fairness. These issues cor-
respond to the central features of the democratic process: the ex-
pression of preference, the aggregation of preference, and the
connection between preference and collective decisions. As com-
pared to the first two conditions, ideas about equity have evolved
enormously over the history of United States democracy. What
were once thought to be fair limits on participation in the early
days of the American Republic are regarded as hopelessly inap-
propriate, and even morally offensive, in the 1990s (for example,
the exclusion of women and African-Americans). The same is true
of influence-fairness (for example, one person, one vote, Voting
Rights Act challenges to at-large elections, and the growing inter-
est in semiproportional systems that were once regarded as inap-
propriately "foreign") and outcome-fairness issues (for example,
affirmative action). The idealist, implicitly at least, thinks in
almost Hegelian terms of a political system .evolving towards
some right system of rules known to those who apply reason to
democratic problems. The proceduralist, on the other hand, recog-
nizes that the system is not shifting towards a static, rationally
ty (University of Chicago Press, 1978).
'2 Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, Presidential Elections (The Free Press,
1980).
MORALISM AND REALISM
revealed ideal, but towards a dynamic ideal in a sometimes non-
linear fashion. Forms of democratic governance discarded in
earlier historical periods can be rediscovered as the solutions to
subsequent problems.
Another important characteristic of equity considerations in
a procedural democracy is that often no dominant consensus
exists on the next step in the evolution of democratic fairness.
Some of the disagreement on these matters is self-interested;
that is, people anticipate whether they will have more or less
influence under one set of rules than another, and they tend, on
average, to prefer the system that bestows advantages upon
them'. But there are also shared notions of fairness, consisting of
other-regarding considerations, that underlie any formal system
of democratic procedures. These concepts evolve through a pro-
cess of consensus building. The fact that prevailing notions of
procedural fairness rely on a mixture of self-interest and a con-
stantly evolving social consensus can be discomforting to would-
be reformers. It is easier to argue for reform when the choices
are between a clearly morally or ethically superior system and
something inferior. It is much harder to argue for reform when
the choices are between systems that advantage one group or
class of individuals over another, or when the choices derive from
widely contested concepts of fairness. As indicated earlier, the
characteristic resistance of reformers to address equity issues
stems from their understandable reluctance to give up what they
perceive to be the moral high ground. However, because so many
other people in the United States political system see the self-
interested and morally contested side of what they propose, the
"good government" position often appears to be self-righteous,
unrealistic, and ultimately counterproductive.
1. Participation equity and campaign finance reform.
The first equity consideration focuses on participation in the
democratic process: who should be allowed to vote, who can give
money to a candidate or spend it, who can run for office, and the
like. The general postwar trend has been to expand the set of
people allowed to participate by giving rights to previously ex-
cluded groups (for example, for reasons of gender, race, or age)
and by lowering the institutional barriers that in effect screened
large numbers of people from participating (for example, literacy
tests, poll taxes, etc.). As an illustration of the earlier point that
evolution in political reform is not necessarily linear, it is in-
structive to observe that barriers to voting were extremely low in
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the early and midnineteenth century. Franchise exclusions in the
form of Jim Crow laws in the South and the strict formal regis-
tration requirements introduced by the progressive reformers in
the name of eliminating corruption came in the last third of the
nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries.3 By
the 1960s, the trend moved back in the direction of greater inclu-
sion rather than exclusion: the Jim Crow laws were abolished by
civil-rights litigation, and Congress and the state legislatures
made efforts to ease bureaucratic restrictions on voting (for ex-
ample, registration drives and expanded use of absentee bal-
lots).54
The participation fairness question in campaign finance is
the same as in voting: who should be allowed to make campaign
contributions and expenditures? With respect to individual con-
tributions, the answer is analogous to the logic of equal voting:
all citizens should have the equal opportunity to make a contri-
bution and spend money on behalf of a candidate or a ballot
proposition. The major difference between voting and contribu-
tion or expenditure rights is that we do not usually restrict the
right to make contributions or expenditures by age or residency
requirements. Age restrictions on giving contributions and mak-
ing expenditures are never discussed, even though the argument
for these is the same as those for restricting the vote franchise:
namely, those under the age of eighteen do not on average have
the judgment and knowledge to exercise their voting rights re-
sponsibly. However, since money can only be used to influence
decisions, whereas the vote actually makes choices, it is reason-
able that we care less about age with respect to money than with
voting. Moreover, few children have the resources or interest to
expend money on political campaigns.
As for residency requirements, the issue of out-of-district
money is more frequently raised than the age issue. Some believe
that representatives become less responsive to their constituent
interests when they rely excessively on contributions by people
who live outside their district or state.55 Assuming that this ar-
Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Why Americans Don't Vote 78-79 (Pan-
theon Books, 1988).
J. M. Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in Bernard
Grofman and Chandler Davidson, eds, Controversies in Minority Voting 135-39 (The
Brookings Institution, 1992).
" See California Commission on Campaign Financing, The New Gold Rush: Financ-
ing California's Legislative Campaigns 56 (Center for Responsive Government, 1985)(cited
in note 3).
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gument is correct, should out-of-district contributions be banned
for that reason? After all, voters who live outside a district's
boundaries are not allowed to vote for candidates running within
those boundaries. Leaving aside for the moment the constitution-
al feasibility of a total ban on all out-of-district contributions and
expenditures, are voting and contributing money within district
boundaries analogous activities? In the sense that voting is about
making choices and giving money is about influence and informa-
tion, the answer is no. But in the sense that political money may
reinforce the single-member, simple-plurality principle of the
voting system, the answer could be yes. Allowing out-of-district
money amounts to creating multiple channels of influence, in-
cluding influence from people and groups who do not live in the
district but who are affected (or at least perceive themselves to
be affected) by the representatives' actions nonetheless. The de-
termination of who fairly has the right to influence a representa-
tive hinges on the particular concept of representation one
adopts. A number of ideas about representation are perfectly
compatible with the basic tenets of procedural democracy. In-
stead, the taste for representational equality comes from some
consensus in a particular democracy about what seems to be fair
and what best promotes governmental legitimacy. Disallowing
out-of-district contributions is a calibration of the system intend-
ed to make the representative more attuned to district interests.
If that calibration enhances the perceived legitimacy of the politi-
cal system, it makes sense as a reform, but, and this is critical,
there is no reason to think that disallowing out-of-district contri-
butions is a sensible reform for every democracy.
Another part of the question of "who can contribute" is
whether that right applies only to individuals or also to groups
and sectoral entities such as unions and businesses. Insofar as
one might want to make channels of political influence reinforce
the single-member, simple-plurality voting system, it makes
sense to restrict the right of giving contributions or spending
money to individuals, and to prohibit or severely constrain group
activity in this area. Allowing groups to contribute acknowledges
that groups have interests that are more than the sum of individ-
ual preferences. If this is true, then the single-member, simple-
vote system does not adequately "voice" all the concerns that
representatives need to hear.
As originally conceived by the founding fathers, the early
American political system was designed to accommodate a wide
variety of influences and incentives: federalism balanced national
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and local concerns, terms of office varied between the House of
Representatives and the Senate, and some officials were elected
by direct election and some by indirect methods." The trend in
the United States has been to homogenize many of these compo-
nents into a form that more closely corresponds with the formal,
individualist ideal.5" In light of this trend, many reformers, not
surprisingly, would prefer to limit group influence by prohibiting
or severely capping these groups' right to make political contribu-
tions or expenditures. Does this make sense? As in the case of
out-of-district expenditures, the basic conditions of a procedural
democracy provide no guidance here, nor do highly moralistic
theories of representation (unless we all happen to share a par-
ticular framework, such as Professor Thompson's deliberative
democracy ideal). In the end, support for the idea of excluding
group contributions will be driven either by calculations of politi-
cal advantage (for example, by consumer groups) or by some
emerging consensus that current practices in campaign finance
are undermining the one person, one vote logic of representation
in the single-member voting system.
2. Influence equity and campaign finance reform.
Beyond the question of who can participate is the issue of
how much influence participants should have. The most obvious
example of this is the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s.
Prior to Baker v Carr58 and Reynolds v Sims,59 district popula-
tions at the state and local level were not always adjusted after
the census, or if they were, the standards of adjustment were
loose and ill defined. As a consequence, a wide variance in dis-
trict sizes occurred within the same legislative bodies. ° Even
though all age-eligible citizens in malapportioned districts who
met the residency requirements and registration deadlines still
had the "equal" right to vote (that is, there was an "equal" oppor-
tunity to participate), voting in differently sized districts seemed
to be unfair. Why?
Bernard Grofinan and Donald Wittman, eds, The Federalist Papers and the New Institution-
alism (Agathon, 1989)(cited in note 4).
"7 See Bruce Cain, The American Electoral System, in Bruce Cain, Gillian Peele, and
Christopher J. Bailey, eds, Developments in American Politics (Macmillian, 1992).
m 369 US 186 (1962).
69 377 US 533 (1964).
' David Butler and Bruce Cain, Congressional Redistricting 18 (Macmillian, 1992).
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The Supreme Court's answer was that individuals have a
right to an equally weighted vote.61 One person's ballot cannot
count for more than another's. When districts are different sizes,
the ability to affect the outcome of the race is inversely propor-
tional to district size. Hence, those who vote in larger districts
have less influence over the outcome than those in smaller dis-
tricts. In other words, the apportionment cases were about
greater equality in the weighting of individual votes. As stated in
the dissenting opinion in Reynolds, and subsequently noted by
numerous commentators, the decision to enforce the principle of
one person, one vote in this case in effect elevated one theory of
representation over all others, namely, the notion that fair deci-
sions were the result of summing equally weighted votes into a
plurality winner."s Representation schemes that deliberately
balanced interests (such as between rural and urban, small and
large, counties) but not voters were declared unconstitutional (ex-
cept the United States Senate).6 3
Just as the ban on out-of-district expenditures may reinforce
single-member electoral incentives, limits on contributions or
expenditures may reinforce the one-person, one-vote principle.
The stricter the limit (the lower the permissible amount someone
can give and spend), the closer such limitations come to imposing
a condition of equality. Of course, even small contributions may
be onerous for the most disadvantaged portions of the population.
Giving money to campaigns, therefore, is primarily a middle- and
upper-middle-class activity." In the sense that drawing equally
populated districts only roughly approximates equal numbers of
registered or actual voters, so too strict contribution ceilings only
roughly produce equality in political money.
A proposal to limit campaign contributions and expenditures
strictly extends the logic of formal individual equality into the
realm of political influence. However, it does this at a cost. First,
it makes solving the collective action problem of producing
enough money to fund a campaign more difficult, because it lim-
its the burden that can be shouldered by the large, wealthy inter-
ests. This, of course, could be viewed as a good thing provided
that there is a way to get the "free riders" to pay their fair share.
Secondly, as was discussed earlier, contributions and expendi-
61 Id at 29-33.
62 Id at 82-90.
Reynolds v Sims, 377 US at 568; Avery v Midland County, 390 US 474, 476 (1968).
Verba, Nie, & Kim, Participation and Political Equality (cited in note 51).
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tures are expressions of political support, and their "information"
will be muddled by artificial limits. The problem with the single-
valued vote, as Robert Dahl and others have noted, is that no
way exists to signify intensity of support-equality, in this sense,
introduces noise into the signal.65 On the other hand, inequali-
ties of wealth introduce noise into the signal that an unlimited
contribution conveys, as discussed earlier.66
A system that enforces equality of both vote and influence
ignores the benefits of complementary, rather than consistent,
government structures. Madisonian governmental design had
complementary features that balanced the limitations of one
aspect with strengths of another. For example, the equal vote
populism of the House of Representatives was balanced against
the state-based inequalities of the Senate. Similarly, the parochi-
alism of the legislature was balanced against the national per-
spective of the executive. The trend in reform has been to make
the features of United States Government at the state and na-
tional levels more consistent rather than complementary. But,
this consistency comes at the cost of balance and may in the long
run magnify inherent weaknesses in the system. For instance,
decisions might become overly responsive to ill-formed
majoritarian preferences.
In the end, some people will still prefer more consistency in
the system and will desire to make political influence more equal.
Even if we disregard the Madisonian problem of balance and
complementarity in representation, the question remains how far
one needs to push equality of influence. Political money is only
one form of political influence, and as political scientists like
Frank Sorauf and Gary Jacobson have reminded us, its influence
is subtle and hard to quantify.67 What about other forms of po-
litical influence? Should we worry about those who have more lei-
sure time to follow and participate in politics? What about the
well-educated and articulate? Professor Lowenstein's answer is
that the money is so uniquely valuable as a resource that it alone
deserves regulation.68 But this is another empirical assertion
' Dahl, A Preface to Democracy at 90 (cited in note 24); Austin-Smith, Campaign
Contributions and Access (cited in note 43).
See note 43 and accompanying text.
67 Sorauf, Money in American Elections at 337-38 (cited in note 48); Gary C. Jacobson,
The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections, 72 Am Pol Sci Rev 469
(1978).
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is
Deeply Rooted, 18 Hofstra L Rev 301 (1989)(cited in note 5).
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that we are asked to accept as common sense (that is, take on
faith). The studies that Lowenstein refers to look at the impact of
money on electoral outcomes, roll-call voting, and committee
activity, but they do not consider the power that money has rela-
tive to other resources. 9 Is money more valuable than the infor-
mation and opinions that public sector and private lobbyists
provide to legislators? What about the influence of those who
have the time to volunteer for campaign work? Even if we decide
all other forms of influence are less valuable than money, does
the search for equally weighted voice lead ultimately to the
equalizing of all significant forms of political influence?
3. Outcome equity and campaign finance.
The last equity consideration is the fairness of either elector-
al or legislative outcomes in a given democracy. v In many sys-
tems, including the United States, this is the most controversial
equity issue. Electoral outcome fairness centers on whether the
ballot results are fair by some standard, such as proportionality,
responsiveness, or symmetry. Proportionality means that the
distribution of representatives with respect to some characteris-
tic, belief, or party mirrors the distribution in the population.
Responsiveness measures the rapidity with which changes in the
vote are reflected by changes in legislative composition.71 Sym-
metry requires that whatever level of proportionality the system
provides to one party or group, it also provide to others.
The thrust of recent electoral reform in America has been to
move the system closer to proportionality. Strictly majoritarian
at-large systems that consistently exaggerate the winner's seat
share have come under attack in a variety of contexts. For in-
stance, the Democratic Party reforms of the 1960s and 1970s
eliminated winner-take-all primaries in order to give less advan-
tage to the front-runner and greater fairness to other candi-
dates.7' Also, the Voting Rights Act has been used by racial and
ethnic minority plaintiffs to challenge the legality of at-large
voting schemes and districting arrangements resulting in the ex-
clusion or substantial underrepresentation of minority represen-
SId at 313.
"0 I draw heavily from the framework of Gary King and Robert X. Browning, Demo-
cratic Representation and Partisan Bias in Congressional Elections, 81 Am Pol Sci Rev
1251 (1987).
71 Id at 1254-55.
7'2 Nelson W. Polsby, Consequences of Party Reform 61-62 (Oxford University Press,
1983).
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tatives7 In both instances, the problem that needed reforming
was the tendency of the rules and procedures under consideration
to produce outcomes that were, many thought, unfair to political
or racial minorities.
An even more far-reaching outcome judgment looks beyond
the attributes of elected representatives to the fairness of the
policies produced by the system. The work of Lani Guinier raises
some of these issues."' The extremely negative reaction to her
ideas during her confirmation controversy is perhaps an indica-
tion that mainstream political opinion in the United States is
still firmly rooted in the purely procedural tradition, as suggested
earlier. 5
There are two outcome perspectives that crop up regularly in
the campaign finance reform debate. The first is the desire to
make elections more competitive (to increase responsiveness).
From this perspective, the problem with the current system is
that incumbents have enormous advantages in raising money
(particularly from interest groups). These advantages, combined
with higher name recognition and other incumbent resources (for
example, government-funded staff support, franking privileges,
etc.), make it extremely hard to defeat most incumbents. 6 Those
who view this as a major flaw in our electoral system seek to find
the proper combination of limits and subsidies to overcome the
natural disadvantages challengers face. An example of this would
be the so-called "floors without ceilings" proposal that would help
challengers by giving them some form of public subsidy but with-
out limits, because challengers get more return from the margin-
al dollar spent than incumbents do. 7
A second outcome perspective, the "progressive agenda," uses
campaign finance reform to overcome resource inequities which
are the by-product of the capitalist system in order to make pos-
sible redistributive and progressive policies. A system that allows
wealthy interests to secure influence though unlimited expendi-
tures and contributions may produce a policy skew that favors
those interests. A progressive agenda seeks to redistribute wealth
more fairly or to provide better services for the disadvantaged.
"' Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, eds, Quiet Revolution in the South: the
Impact of the Voting Rights Act 1965-1990 (Princeton University Press, 1994).
7' See, generally, Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority (cited in note 38).
7' See note 32 and accompanying text.
78 See, generally, Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections 31-45
(Little, Brown and Co., 1983).
77 Id.
MORALISM AND REALISM
Such an agenda could be facilitated by reforms that curb the
political influence of wealthy special interests.
One problem with approaching campaign finance reform
from an outcome equity perspective is that it increases the diffi-
cult process of building consensus. This is particularly true of the
so-called progressive perspective, because it infuses an explicitly
political agenda into basic rule considerations-in essence, we are
asked to change the rules in order to remedy the policy skew, but
that assumes that a clear majority of people want to remedy the
skew. The evidence of public opinion since the 1960s casts seri-
ous doubt upon that assumption.7" The competitiveness goal is
somewhat more widely accepted, but even here, there is a ten-
dency for people to endorse competitiveness as a systemic value,
but not to want their representatives (if they like him or her) to
have competitive races.
One last point about outcome fairness perspectives is that
these perspectives also make it difficult for people to look at
potential reform dispassionately. As mentioned earlier, it is hard
for Democrats, Republicans, public interest groups, special inter-
est groups, and the like not to view reform from the vantage
point of personal gain or loss. When rules are completely endoge-
nous with policy preferences, winners think the rules are fair and
losers regard them as unfair. If rules are adopted solely because
they yield a desired policy outcome, rules will change as the
majority shifts. This, of course, was the bitter lesson of Demo-
cratic Party reforms in the 1960s and 1970s. 7" In Rawlsian lan-
guage, it is better to think about these things behind "the veil of
ignorance," but it is too hard to get behind the veil and stay
there-particularly for political actors.8" The advantage of re-
stricting equity arguments to the first two types-participation
and influence equity-is that it keeps the discussion behind a
boundary of process-regarding issues, which does not eliminate
the problem of rules-policy endogeneity, but at least deflects
attention from hopelessly political vantage points.
' See Norman H. Nie, John R. Petrocik, and Sidney Verba, The Changing American
Voter (Harvard University Press, 1976).
See, generally, Polsby, Consequences of Party Reform (cited in note 72).
Jo j. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 136-42 (Harvard University Press, 1971).
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CONCLUSION
What difference does it make to adopt a realist/proceduralist
versus a moralist/idealist perspective? It does not mean that
realists will necessarily adopt different positions than idealists on
every reform issue. One might conclude that there should be
contribution limits, spending caps, public financing, and disclo-
sure from either idealist or proceduralist premises. A realist
perspective does, however, change the reasons for taking those
positions. By changing the reasons, the choice of perspective may
alter the way we think about these various alternatives. Moral-
ists and proceduralists tend to agree for roughly similar reasons
about disclosure. They also agree that bribery and extortion, as
traditionally defined, are bad things for a democracy, but they
hold this belief for different reasons: the moralist because the
motive is inappropriate (corrupt), and the proceduralist because
it undermines the equality of the voting system. The realist and
the moralist may also come to different conclusions about how far
to extend the notion of bribery into campaign finance reform.
Moralists see special interest contributions as traditional bribes,
and proceduralists see them as alternative forms of influence
which they might or might not want to restrict depending upon
their taste for equity.
The starkest contrast between these two approaches is in the
area of contribution limits, spending caps, and public financing.
The moralist position really presents no framework for thinking
about these issues in productive ways, because the bribery con-
cept says little about most aspects of equity. Even Professor
Thompson's deliberative democracy ideal leaves equity out of an
otherwise large set of ethical considerations. The proceduralist's
logic presents a clearer view of how campaign finance reform fits
into the larger picture of political reform generally. To what ex-
tent should the political system be designed around formal indi-
vidual equality? Should paths of political influence operate under
the same principles as the voting system? What role should inter-
est groups play in democratic decision making? In the end, even
though the proceduralist approach raises difficult and potentially
controversial questions about power and influence in a democra-
cy, proceduralist-based reforms, once agreed to, are likely to have
a firmer and more consistent basis within the entire political
system.
